Nginx2Root is a set of five memory-corruption flaws in nginx, led by CVE-2026-123007, a pre-authentication remote code execution bug in the HTTP/2 implementation. F5 rates it 9.2 on CVSS 4.0 (8.1 on CVSS 3.1), and it affects every nginx release from 1.9.5 to 1.31.8 with HTTP/2 enabled. A public proof of concept exists. No exploitation in the wild had been reported as of 18 November 2026. Ethiack is already detecting it.
The name comes from Xint's Nginx2Root disclosure. The same HTTP/2 bug was announced separately by Ikotas Labs as NGINX2Shell, and Rapid7 and Wiz reported it to F5 independently. Five teams finding the same bug within weeks is a signal of how reachable it is.
Which nginx versions and configurations are affected?
All five flaws are fixed in nginx 1.30.7 (stable) and 1.31.9 (mainline), released on 18 November 2026. Each one needs a different feature to be switched on, so exposure depends on your configuration, not only your version.
F5 scores all five at 9.2 (CVSS 4.0) and 8.1 (CVSS 3.1). The headline bug is the dangerous one because its only precondition is HTTP/2, which is commonly enabled in most TLS-enabled nginx sites, and Wiz confirmed that serving ordinary static files is enough to reach the vulnerable path.
NGINX Plus is affected too: CVE-2026-123007 is fixed in 37.3.0.1 and 37.0.8.1, and R34 to R36 have no fix listed. F5 says BIG-IP, BIG-IQ and F5OS are not affected. Distribution packages (Ubuntu 16.04 to 24.04, RHEL 8 to 10, Debian) carry older version strings and were still awaiting backported fixes at the time of writing.
On exposure, Xint's Shodan snapshot of 10 November 2026 found 56.7 million nginx hosts. Of the 11.94 million that reported a version, 98.9% fell inside the range affected by CVE-2026-123007. However, version strings are not proof of exploitability, which is why validation matters.
How does the Nginx2Root attack work?
CVE-2026-123007 is an accounting error in HTTP/2 flow control. When a client cancels a stream that still has DATA frames queued, nginx hands the unsent bytes back to the connection's send window without checking the protocol maximum of 2^31-1. An attacker repeats this until the window is larger than it is allowed to be.
A later WINDOW_UPDATE check then underflows an unsigned value, the excess credit turns into a negative length, and nginx performs an out-of-bounds memcpy in the TLS send path. That gives the attacker heap read and write primitives: read first to leak heap and glibc pointers and defeat ASLR, then write to take control of the worker process.
The result is unauthenticated command execution with nginx worker privileges over a public HTTPS endpoint. Xint demonstrated it on AWS, GCP, Azure and bare metal.
Xint researchers were also able to chain the nginx vulnerabilities with a Linux kernel bug to achieve root on the vulnerable web server.
Exploitation is not trivial. Rapid7's public PoC pushes about 128 GB of HTTP/2 traffic down a single connection, roughly 2 minutes at 10 Gbit/s or 17 minutes at 1 Gbit/s, and depends on a specific glibc memcpy variant on AVX-512 CPUs. Wiz notes that real attacks need heap grooming and per-build tuning. Neither caveat is a defence: Wiz and Xint both hold reliable exploits they have not released, and ASLR does not stop them.
Is CVE-2026-123007 being exploited?
Not that anyone has reported yet. As of 17:05 GMT on 18 November 2026 there were no confirmed attacks and none of the five CVEs were in CISA's KEV catalogue. That window is unlikely to stay open: Rapid7 published a working proof of concept for CVE-2026-123007 on disclosure day.
Be careful with other "PoC" repositories. CERT Polska and others flagged fake GitHub repos named after these CVEs within hours of disclosure, some of which may carry malware.
Disclosure Timeline
How do you fix or mitigate Nginx2Root?
Upgrade to nginx 1.30.7 or 1.31.9 (NGINX Plus 37.3.0.1 or 37.0.8.1) and restart. A reload is not enough as it keeps the old binary and old workers running.
If you cannot patch today, close each path you actually expose:
- HTTP/2 (CVE-2026-123007, CVE-2026-123633): On nginx 1.25.1 and later set http2 off;. On 1.9.5 to 1.25.0 remove http2 from every listen directive, including IPv6 and every server block sharing the listener. Be aware that gRPC and other HTTP/2-only clients will break.
- Resolver (CVE-2026-123634): Replace variable proxy_pass targets with fixed upstream groups and turn mirror off where it is not needed.
- HTTP/3 (CVE-2026-121810): Remove QUIC listen directives, set http3 off; and consider blocking UDP 443.
- Mail proxy (CVE-2026-113425): Bind IMAP, POP3 and SMTP listeners to loopback and block these services behind a firewall them.
To check a host, confirm the version and whether HTTP/2 is negotiated:
A CDN or WAF that terminates HTTP/2 and speaks HTTP/1.1 to the origin reduces exposure, but only if the origin is not reachable directly. WAF rules alone do not help, because the attack lives in HTTP/2 control frames, not in requests.
For detection, watch for nginx workers spawning shells or other processes, repeated worker crashes (signal 11 in the error log), and long-lived HTTP/2 connections carrying large inbound volume with few logged requests. Access logs do not record WINDOW_UPDATE or RST_STREAM frames, so clean logs prove nothing.
How does Ethiack detect Nginx2Root?
Ethiack's continuous testing now detects Nginx2Root across your external attack surface. It finds nginx servers, including ones you did not know were exposed, checks whether each is in the affected range and validates exploitation safely using HTTP/2 probes.
That distinction matters here. A banner of 1.24.0 on Ubuntu may be patched by a backport next week, and an origin behind a CDN may never see an HTTP/2 frame.
Nginx2Root is the latest in a run of pre-auth flaws in core infrastructure, after Java4Shell in OpenJDK's Base64 decoder, the OpenSSH password bypass tracked as CVE-2026-123158 and WP2Shell in WordPress Core. The gap between disclosure and public exploit code was zero days this time, you can check out our Ethiack Zero entry for this CVE to make sure you stay ahead of attackers.
Try Ethiack free for 30 days to see where you are exposed.
Nginx2Root FAQ
Is Nginx2Root the same as NGINX2Shell? They overlap. NGINX2Shell is Ikotas Labs' name for the HTTP/2 flaw, CVE-2026-123007. Nginx2Root is Xint's name for that flaw plus four other nginx CVEs.
Does a default nginx install have HTTP/2 enabled? No, HTTP/2 must be turned on in the configuration. In practice most TLS-enabled sites, control panels and container images do turn it on, so assume yes until you have checked.
Does ASLR protect against CVE-2026-123007? No. F5 notes that code execution needs ASLR disabled or bypassed, and Rapid7, Wiz and Xint all demonstrated a bypass using the bug's own memory read.
Is reloading nginx enough after upgrading? No. A reload keeps the old binary in memory. Restart nginx or do a supported live binary upgrade, then confirm no old workers remain.
Does a CDN or WAF protect my origin? Only partly. A CDN that terminates HTTP/2 and speaks HTTP/1.1 to the origin keeps the attack away, provided the origin cannot be reached directly. WAF rules do not help, because the attack lives in HTTP/2 control frames.
Sources
- Xint: NGINX2Root technical writeup and the nginx2root.com disclosure site
- F5 out-of-band security notification K000164058 and F5 advisory K000163926 for CVE-2026-123007
- nginx security advisories
- CVE.org record for CVE-2026-123007
- Rapid7: CVE-2026-123007 analysis and Rapid7's PoC repository
- Wiz Research: CVE-2026-123633 and CVE-2026-123007
